Field of Operations: Leningrad

This is the terrifying story

of the titanic duel fought

between the armies of Hitler and Stalin in the bitter cold

of an Arctic winter outside Leningrad.

It was here that the men of the German Army Group North

fought and died with the men of the Red Army.

The German forces were so constantly short of manpower

and material, that they christened the pitiless war

they were fighting, "The eternal war of the poor man".

The Russians too, had to endure terrible hardship.

And the siege of Leningrad contains heartrending tales

of suffering and heroism,

but the Russian sacrifice was ultimately to be vindicated.

For the men of Army Group North

there was to be no such satisfaction.

Most were destined never to return to Germany.

The ceaseless demands of the cruelest conflict in history

would ultimately claim the whole Army Group as its victim.

In late 1940

when Adolf Hitler finally confirmed to the general staff

that he had irrevocably decided to attack Russia,

a plan was swiftly conceived by General Marcks

which envisaged a two pronged advance by two huge army

groups totaling over 3,500,000 men.

The German grand strategy

was for two great parallel advances.

The first aimed at Leningrad in the North,

then swinging South to Moscow.

And the second at Odesa on the black sea.

During the winter of 1939,

Finland had been involved in an uneven struggle with Soviet

Russia to protect her territory.

Under the leadership of field marshal Mannerheim

the Fins had doggedly resisted

the superior Russian forces,

but ultimately had to yield

valuable territory around Leningrad.

Britain had refused to help the Fins who in 1941,

turned to Germany for aid in regaining their lost territory.

Hitler hoped to draw Finland

into an offensive war with Russia,

but the finish objective was simply to address the balance,

not the conquest of Russia.

Although the Fins would play a small part

in the battle for Leningrad,

their refusal to mount an invasion of Soviet territory

would ultimately have dire consequences for Hitler.

Under the Marcks plan,

elements of Army Group North,

were to capture Leningrad,

then drive North to link up with the Fins

and eliminate all Russian forces

in the Baltic region.

Only then was Moscow to be attacked

from the West and North simultaneously.

From the very outset

Hitler found it impossible to prioritize

the objectives for his Russian campaign.

After much discussion and argument,

the Marcks plan was subsequently revised to produce three

separate army groups.

Each aimed at a different objective.

Army Group North was to capture Leningrad,

Army Group Center was to capture Moscow

and Army Group South was aimed at Odesa.

With three major objectives to achieve

it was clear from the outset that German forces

would be dangerously overstretched.

Sections of the German military

were very opposed to the venture,

but Hitler refused to accept

the advice of his staff officers.

His gamblers instinct told him that if he delayed

even for one year,

the crowds that cheered the latest successes

so fervently, might no longer be willing to follow him into

so hazardous an undertaking.

And there was surely no greater military adventure

than the invasion of Russia.

Following the spectacular victories in Poland, Norway,

France and the Balkans,

the German forces assembled for Barbarossa expected to fight

a short campaign,

which would secure their victories throughout Europe.

Hitler became convinced that he could crush the Red Army

as easily as he had defeated his other enemies.

In the spring of 1941

field marshal von Rundstedt,

who had spent most of the first world war

on the Eastern front, asked Hitler outright

if he knew what it meant to invade Russia.

The commander in chief, field marshal von Brauchitsch

and his chief of the general staff general Halder

also counseled Hitler against the operation.

It was all to no avail

as Hitler simply refused to heed their warnings.

Field Marshall von Rundstedt,

the commander of Army Group South

was forthright in his views on the forthcoming battle.

"This war with Russia is a nonsensical idea

to which I can see no happy ending.

But if for political reasons,

the war is unavoidable,

then we must face the fact that it cannot be won

in a single summer campaign.

Just look at the distances involved.

We cannot possibly defeat the enemy and occupy the whole

of Western Russia from the Baltic to the black sea

within a few short months.

We should prepare for a long war

and go for our objectives step by step.

First of all,

a strong Army Group North should capture Leningrad

and the area around it.

This would enable us to link up with the Fins,

eliminate the red fleet from the Baltic and increase

our influence in Scandinavia.

The central and Southern army groups should

for the time being

advance only to align running Odesa, Kiev,

Orsha, Lake Ilmen.

Then if we have sufficient time this year

Army Group North could advance Southeast

from Leningrad towards Moscow while Army Group Center

move eastwards on the capital.

All further operations should be postponed until 1942,

when we should make new plans based on the situation

as it then is."

Had Hitler followed von Rundstedt's good advice,

the history of the Western world may well have followed

a very different pattern.

Hitler, however, did have good grounds

for rejecting the advice of his officers.

While the German army in the 1930s had been building

its strength under Hitler,

Stalin had been destroying the Russian officer Corps.

By the end of the purge,

the Russian army had lost three of the five remaining

marshals of the Soviet union,

all 11 deputy ministers of defense,

75 of the 80 members of the military Soviet,

all the commanders of the military districts,

13 of the 15 army commanders,

more than half the Corps commanders

and approximately 30% of the officers

below brigade level.

Stalin had considered himself safe

as he did not intend to become involved in Western affairs.

He had made complex peace treaties

and alliances with both Britain and Germany

and hoped they would fight a mutually destructive war

in the West.

Less than one year later, however,

Stalin's hopes of a protracted war between the Western

powers and Hitler, evaporated with the brilliant success

of Hitler's Blitzkrieg tactics, which saw Denmark, Norway,

Holland, Belgium, and France fall in rapid succession.

The lightning campaign through the Balkans in Greece in 1941

could only produce more grounds for disquiet.

Though Stalin accepted that war with Germany

was now almost inevitable,

he certainly did not expect to be attacked in 1941.

He decided Russia had at least until the spring of 1942

to prepare herself.

His explosive denials of all contrary

information was so fierce that vital intelligence concerning

German preparations was kept from him by subordinates

fearful of the violence of his temper.

As the German buildup towards operation Barbarossa continued

Stalin's attempts to pacify Hitler grew more desperate.

He had already stated in an interview with Pravda

in November 1939,

that it was not Germany who had attacked Britain and France,

but Britain and France who had attacked Germany.

Stalin now forbade

any criticism of Germany to be printed in the newspapers.

In 1940, he increased Russian supplies

to Germany and withdrew

recognition of the Norwegian

and Belgian governments in exile.

In the following year

when Hitler successfully invaded

Greece and Yugoslavia, Stalin quickly expelled

the Yugoslavian ambassador

to Moscow and refused a request

to recognize the Greek government in exile.

Stalin felt he was continuing to buy time with these

unrequited concessions, but his use of the breathing space,

which he had already obtained was totally devoid of any

worthwhile attempt to remedy his military disadvantages.

The main Russian force charged with defending Leningrad