The Unknown Known

Let me put up this next memo.

You want me to read this?

Yes, please.

"February 4, 2004.

Subject: What you know.

There are known knowns.

There are known unknowns.

There are unknown unknowns.

But there are also unknown knowns.

That is to say, things that you think you know

that it turns out you did not."

I wonder if in the future

public figures will write as many memos as I did.

I doubt it.

I must have gotten in the habit of dictating

things that were important.

Not a diary.

Not a journal.

They're almost all working documents.

Now, they've become historical documents in retrospect,

but at the time, they all had a purpose.

In the later years of my using the dictaphone,

why, they were called snowflakes,

because they were on white paper.

What would you say the total number of memos

might be?

They said I dictated 20,000

just in the last six years at the Pentagon.

There have to be millions.

"July 27, 2001."

A memo to Condoleezza Rice concerning Iraq.

"We have discussed Iraq on a number of occasions.

The discussions have been inconclusive.

Sanctions are being limited

in a way that cannot weaken Saddam Hussein.

We can publicly acknowledge that the sanctions don't work

over extended periods and stop the pretense

of having a policy that is keeping Saddam

'in the box' when we know he has crawled

a good distance out of the box.

Within a few years,

the U.S. will undoubtedly have to confront

a Saddam armed with nuclear weapons.

If Saddam's regime were oustered,

we would have a much-improved position

in the region and elsewhere."

Why the obsession with Iraq and Saddam?

Well, you love that word, "obsession."

I can see the glow in your face when you say it.

Well, I'm an obsessive person.

Are you? I'm not.

I'm-- I'm cool.

I'm measured.

If you look at the range of my memos,

there might be 1/10 of 1% about Iraq.

The reason I was concerned about Iraq

is 'cause four-star generals would come to me and say,

"Mr. secretary, we have a problem.

Our orders are to fly over the northern part of Iraq

and the Southern part of Iraq on a daily basis,

with the Brits, and we are getting shot at.

At some moment-- could be tomorrow,

could be next month, could be next year--

one of our planes is gonna be shot down

and our pilots and crews are gonna be killed

or they're gonna be captured."

The question will be,

"what in the world were we flying those flights for?

What was the cost-benefit ratio?

What was our country gaining?"

So you sit down and you say,

"I think I'm gonna see

if I can get the president's attention.

Remind him that our planes are being shot at,

remind him that we don't have a fresh policy for Iraq,

and remind him that we've got a whole range of options."

Not an obsession.

A very measured, nuanced approach,

I think.

In my confirmation hearing

when I was nominated to be secretary of defense,

the best question I was asked was,

"what do you worry about when you go to bed at night?"

And my answer was, in effect,

"intelligence.

The danger that we can be surprised

because of a failure of imagining

what might happen in the world."

There are known knowns, the things we know we know.

There are known unknowns,

the things we know we don't know.

There are also that third category

of unknown unknowns,

the things we don't know we don't know.

And you can only know more about those things

by imagining what they might be.

Pearl harbor was a failure of imagination.

We didn't know we didn't know

that they could do what they did the way they did it.

We had people working on breaking codes.

We had people thinking through,

"what are the kinds of things they might do?"

And lo and behold, the carriers were able to,

on a Sunday morning, get very close to Hawaii,

launch their planes, and impose enormous destruction.

Was it failure of imagination

or failure to look at the intelligence

that was available?

They had thought through

a great many more obvious possibilities.

People were chasing the wrong rabbit.

That one possibility was not something

that they had imagined was likely.

"July 23, 2001.

Subject: 'Pearl harbor post-mortem.'

in some future hearing,

I am going to say that I do not want

to be sitting before this panel

in a modern-day version of a pearl harbor post-mortem:

Who didn't do what, when, where, and why.

None of us would want to have to be back here

going through that agony."

A month or so before September 11, 2001,

it would be wrong to think that someone who wrote it--

namely me, was prescient.

I wasn't.

I simply had read enough history

that I worried.

American 11, climb,

maintain flight level 350.

American 11, climb, maintain flight level 350.

American 11, Boston.

The American on the frequency, how do you hear me?

American 11, if you hear Boston center

re-contact Boston center on 127.82.

That's American 11, 127.82.

My military assistant,

admiral Ed Giambastiani, came in and said,

"a plane has hit the world trade center."

It was assumed to be an accident.

And I went into my office from the conference room,

and admiral Giambastiani said, "another plane has hit

the other world trade center tower."

And of course, at that point,

it wasn't an accident; It was an attack.

Within minutes, I felt the Pentagon shake.

That's how our day began on September 11th.

They had hit the center of economic power in New York,

and they then had hit the center of military power

at the Pentagon.

You need to find out what had happened.

What was it?

I got up and went down the hall, and--

on my floor, until the smoke was so bad

I had to get outside.

Then I went downstairs and outside and around the corner,

and here were pieces of that American airlines airplane

just spread all over the apron, all over the grass.

Flames and smoke,

people being brought out of the building

who were injured and burned and wounded.

The first responders really hadn't arrived yet.

There were very few people there.

How do you think that they got away with 9/11?

It seems amazing in retrospect.

Everything seems amazing in retrospect.

Pearl harbor seems amazing in retrospect.

It's a failure of imagination.

It's not as though you aren't aware of possibilities,

but you tend to favor some possibilities

more than others.

And it's enormously important to have priorities.

What are you gonna worry about?

What is it you want to do?

What are you gonna be prepared for?

And you have to pick and choose.

Well, to the extent you pick and choose

and you're wrong...

...the penalty can be enormous.

"September 30, 2001."

Memorandum. Title: "Strategic thoughts."

"The U.S. strategic theme should be aiding local peoples

to rid themselves of terrorists

and to free themselves of regimes

that support terrorism.

The regimes of such states should see that it will be fatal

to host terrorists who attack the United States.

The United States government should envision

a goal along these lines.

New regimes in Afghanistan and another key state or two

that supports terrorism.

Syria out of Lebanon.

Dismantlement or destruction

of weapons of mass destruction capabilities.

If the war does not significantly change

the world's political map,

the U.S. will not achieve its aim."

On my orders, the United States military

has begun strikes

against Al-Qaeda terrorist training camps